deviate from a proposal submitted by a Member State. Only in a limited number of cases the Treaty seems to have foreseen a true procedural function of initiatives by the High Representative, in the sense that an initiative is needed for the Council to be able to act. On the basis of Art. 31.2 TEU the Council may act by qualified majority "on a proposal which the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has presented following a specific request from the European Council" and Art. 33 TEU provides that "the Council may, on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, appoint a special representative with a mandate in relation to particular policy issues."
In addition, the Treaty refers to a number of other specific institutional issues in which a proposal by the High Representative seems to have a more formal role. Thus, Art. 27.3 TEU states that "The Council shall act on a proposal from the High Representative after consulting the European Parliament and after obtaining the consent of the Commission" when deciding on the organization and functioning of the European External Action Service; Art. 42.3 TEU states that "The Council shall adopt by a qualified majority, on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy" decisions related to the start-up fund for expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications; Art. 218.3 TFEU states that "the Commission, or the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy […] shall submit recommendations to the Council" in relation to the negotiation of international agreements; and Art. 329.2 TFEU states that "the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy […] shall give an opinion on whether the enhanced cooperation proposed is consistent with the Union"s common foreign and security policy."
The Right to Convene an Extraordinary Council Meeting

From Maastricht to Nice
The possibility to convene an extraordinary Council meeting when it is not possible or not preferred to await the next regular Council meeting is closely linked to the right of initiative and has been part of the CFSP institutional machinery from the outset. The original Art. J.8.4
TEU-Maastricht listed the possibility as follows:
In cases requiring a rapid decision, the 2), with one minor modification ("48 hours" instead of "forty-eight hours").
From the Constitutional Treaty to the Treaty of Lisbon
The Constitutional Treaty moved the competence to convene an extraordinary meeting from It is interesting to note that the possibility for the Commission to request an extraordinary meeting was deleted. Taken together with the removal of the individual right of initiative of the Commission under CFSP (supra) this underlines the upgraded position of the High
Representative, but at the cost of the Commission. Member States still have a possibility to request the High Representative to convene an extraordinary emergency meeting.
Unanimity and Constructive Abstention
From Maastricht to Nice
The unanimity rule is at the heart of the "intergovernmental" image of CFSP. Indeed, it is safe to assume that the inclusion of CFSP in the Maastricht Treaty was possible only because of At first sight this opened the possibility of so-called "coalitions of the able and willing";
CFSP actions no longer depended on the approval and implementation of all Member States, the more flexible approach allowed for smaller groups of states to engage in a certain action or to adopt a position. On closer inspection, however, non-participation through the issuing of a formal declaration did not at all deprive the abstaining Council member from obligations based on the adopted decision. After all, the decision taken by the Council remains a "Union decision". While the abstaining state may not be asked to actively implement this decision, it had to accept that "the decision commits the Union". This is underlined by the rule that "in a spirit of mutual solidarity, the member state This implied that in that case a decision could be taken. However, there seemed to be no legally relevant advantage in using this opportunity, since it followed from the text of this provision that the abstaining Member State(s) would nonetheless be bound by the adopted decision.
From the Constitutional Treaty to the Treaty of Lisbon
The 2005 Thus unanimity is still the rule, which stands in stark contrast to the other EU policies where QMV has been established as the default voting rule. German and French proposals to make QMV the default option did not make it.
19
A novel element in this provision is the explicit exclusion of the adoption of "legislative acts". If anything, this element clearly distinguishes CFSP from the other Union policy areas. The Constitutional Treaty already excluded "European laws and framework laws" from the instruments to be used for CFSP, which could only be shaped on the basis of "European decisions" (Art. I-40.6 TCE). The exclusion of "legislative acts" in Art. 31.1 TEU is confirmed by Art. 24.1 TEU:
[…]The common foreign and security policy is subject to specific rules and
procedures. It shall be defined and implemented by the European Council and the
Council acting unanimously, except where the Treaties provide otherwise. The adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded.[…]
The CFSP instrument is therefore the "Decision" (compare Art. 25.1 TEU), which should not be confused with the "Decision" used in other policy areas. This latter type of "Decision" is still one of the key legal acts of the Union and is described in Art. 288 TFEU ("A decision The last sentence in the Article seems to imply that the "general guidelines" are not to be seen as "decisions". The practical relevance of that distinction is not clear, apart from the obvious fact that guidelines may not be adopted on the basis of QMV (see below). They do seem to be binding on the Member States as the loyalty obligation in Art. 24.3 TEU is not limited to "Decisions". On the other hand, they do not seem to be able to function as a source of QMV in the Council, as Art. 31.2 TEU only refers to "a decision of the European Council".
Towards Qualified Majority Voting in CFSP?
From Maastricht to Nice
The debate on majority voting has been present in CFSP negotiations from the outset. An early compromise was found in Declaration No. 27, adopted by the Maastricht IGC, providing 
For their adoption, decisions shall require at least 232 votes in favour cast by at least two thirds of the members. When a decision is to be adopted by the Council by a qualified majority, a member of the Council may request verification that the Member States constituting the qualified majority represent at least 62% of the total population of the Union. If that condition is shown not to have been met, the decision in question shall not be adopted.
A completely different opportunity for the Council to escape unanimity is when the question is "procedural", in which case the Council shall act by a majority of its members.
Article J.8.2 TEU-Maastricht already included this exception:
[...] The Council shall act unanimously, except for procedural questions [...].
Nowhere in Art. J.8 TEU-Maastricht, nor in any other part of the Treaty were these "procedural questions" further defined or was the procedure for their adoption provided. The only possible conclusion on the basis of Art. J.8 TEU-Maastricht was that they need not be adopted unanimously. Hence, one could argue that a simple majority would be sufficient.
However, the conclusion that the adoption of procedural questions was subject to the rules governing QMV was more in line with the context of the CFSP Title in the Maastricht TEU, in which the only other exception to the unanimity rule was dealt with by QMV as well.
The 1997 "This paragraph shall not apply to decisions having military or defence implications"). "-The Working Group underlines that, in order to avoid CFSP inertia and encourage a proactive CFSP, maximum use should be made of existing provisions for the use of QMV, and of provisions allowing for some form of flexibility, such as constructive abstention.
From the Constitutional Treaty to the Treaty of Lisbon
-In addition, the Working Group recommends that a new provision be inserted in the Treaty, which would provide for the possibility of the European Council agreeing by unanimity to extend the use of QMV in the field of CFSP; -Several members consider that "joint initiatives" should be approved by QMV."
Article III-300.1 TCE nevertheless maintained the "unanimity rule ("The European decisions referred to in this Chapter shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously").
Article III-300.2 TCE listed four exceptions to the unanimity rule. Three situations in which QMV could be used where already part of the Amsterdam regime (albeit perhaps in a somewhat modified language):
(a) when adopting European decisions defining a Union action or position on the basis of a European decision of the European Council relating to the Union's strategic interests and objectives, as referred to in Article III-293(1);
In line with the overall use of the term "European decisions" for all CFSP legal acts, in this provision the Common Strategies of the European Council were replaced by "European decisions of the European Council relating to the Union"s strategic interests and objectives".
(c) when adopting a European decision implementing a European decision defining a Union action or position; (d) when adopting a European decision concerning the appointment of a special representative in accordance with Article III-302.
One situation was new: Irrespective of the fact that unanimity is still the rule in CFSP, the exceptions to the rule have increased over time. In addition to the specific exceptions that were introduced since the This would mean that the European Council has been given the competence to extend the list of (currently) four exceptions to the unanimity rule, which would indeed resemble a true passarelle. Nevertheless, in some Member States (e.g. the United Kingdom and Germany), the government will not be able to agree to the use of this passarelle without prior approval by its parliament. 
Concluding Observations
The purpose of this paper was to establish whether -and to which extend -the Lisbon Treaty could be seen as another step in the development of the CFSP with a view to two main elements: the right of initiative and the voting rules. Based on earlier research on the development of the CFSP legal order, the hypothesis was that the new Lisbon rules would show a move towards a less intergovernmental CFSP.
In historical perspective a development is indeed undeniable, but the finally emerging picture is, at best, mixed. Indeed the inclusion of CFSP, together with all other Union policies in one "Constitutional Treaty" in 2005 seemed to make an end to the specific nature of CFSP.
In addition, the Constitutional Treaty introduced the "Union Minister for Foreign Affairs" -modified by the Lisbon Treaty to "High Representative of the Union" -as the successor to the "High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy". Thus a new, more supranational, element into the CFSP by allowing initiatives in this area to be taken by an "agent" of the Union, rather than just by Member States. Similarly, the competence to convene an extraordinary meeting was moved from the Presidency to the High Representative, which implied that for the first time the Council could be convened on the initiative of the EU itself.
Also with regard to the voting rules, some major steps have been taken over time. The introduction of "constructive abstention" by the Amsterdam Treaty was maintained by later treaty modifications. Together with the fact that non-participation by a Member State through the issuing of a formal declaration did not at all deprive this abstaining Council member from obligations based on the adopted decision, the procedure in practice comes closes to QMV.
After all, the decision taken by the Council remains a "Union decision". While the abstaining state may not be asked to actively implement this decision, it has to accept that "the decision commits the Union". In addition both the Constitutional Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon extended the possibilities for QMV. The most important innovation in this regard may very well be the introduction of the passarelle clause, which allows the European Council to unanimously adopt a decision stipulating that the Council shall act by a qualified majority.
This opened the way to more QMV in CFSP without formal treaty amendment. Finally, it is worth noting that the "important and stated reasons" which could be invoked by Member
States wishing to block QMV where replaced by "vital and stated reasons", by which -at least on paper -the possibility to oppose QMV was further restricted.
At the same time, during the Convention for Europe which was to prepare the IGC on the Thus unanimity is still the rule, which stands in stark contrast to the other EU policies where since "Lisbon" QMV has been established as the default voting rule. German and French proposals to make QMV the default option for CFSP did not make it. Still, as a counter-weight to the new exceptions to the unanimity rule that did make it to the final text, the Treaty maintained the "emergency brake" for situations in which a member of the Council declares that, for vital and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by QMV. Finally, the explicit exclusion of the adoption of
